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The Internet has enabled the emergence of collective problem solving, also
known as crowdsourcing, as a viable option for solving complex tasks. However,
the openness of crowdsourcing presents a challenge because solutions obtained
by it can be sabotaged, stolen, and manipulated at a low cost for the attacker.
We extend a previously proposed crowdsourcing dilemma game to an iterated
game to address this question. We enumerate pure evolutionarily stable strate-
gies within the class of so-called reactive strategies, i.e., those depending on the
last action of the opponent. Among the 4096 possible reactive strategies, we
find 16 strategies each of which is stable in some parameter regions. Repeated
encounters of the players can improve social welfare when the damage inflicted
by an attack and the cost of attack are both small. Under the current frame-
work, repeated interactions do not really ameliorate the crowdsourcing dilemma
in a majority of the parameter space.
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Crowdsourcing has opened a plethora of possibilities for individuals around
the world to connect, coordinate, and solve complex problems that are currently
beyond computational capabilities [1–15]. At the same time, a number of prob-
lems have arisen by the use of this novel technology. In particular, the openness
of crowdsourcing presents individuals with an opportunity to exhibit antisocial
behavior such as plagiarizing, sabotaging, and manipulating the solution being
collectively obtained (see Refs. [16] and [17] for brief reviews).
Although techniques for securing crowdsourcing operations have been ex-
panding steadily, so has the number of applications of crowdsourcing [18]. As
a result, a silver bullet to secure crowdsourcing for all possible attacks may be
difficult to find. Services such as Amazon’s Mechanical Turk will likely diminish
the problem of intentional attacks by using a reputation system, discouraging
participants to sabotage [12]. Other approaches such as error correction have
also been shown to be effective in crowdsourcing settings. However, they are
limited in their applicability to specific contexts [19]. In this study, we con-
sider the possibility that repeated encounters between the same peers alleviate
sabotage.
Motivated in part by the DARPA Network Challenge [9,10], a crowdsourcing
dilemma game in which two competing firms interact in a two-stage game was
recently proposed [16]. In the first stage, each of the two firms selects whether or
not to achieve a given task via crowdsourcing. If the firm decides not to crowd-
source, it tries to solve the problem in-house. In the second stage, the firms
have the option of attacking the opponent if the opponent has selected to solve
the task via crowdsourcing. The equilibrium strategies of the model depend on
complex tradeoffs between the productivity value, the benefit of attack, and the
cost of attack. In summary, there are three parameter regions. First, crowd-
sourcing by both agents is the unique equilibrium when the damage inflicted by
an attack is low. Second, the in-house solution (i.e., not crowdsourcing) selected
by both agents is the unique equilibrium when the damage inflicted by an attack
is high and the cost of attack is low. Third, the crowdsourcing by both agents
and the in-house solution of both agents are two equilibria when the damage
inflicted by an attack is high and the cost of attack is high.
In the crowdsourcing dilemma game [16], attacking the opponent’s task that
has been crowdsourced lessens the welfare of both parties, which is a social
dilemma. In the theory of cooperation in social dilemma situations, there
have been proposed various mechanisms to evade socially undesirable equilibria.
One such mechanism is iterated interaction, also called direct reciprocity, which
has been successful in realizing mutual cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma
game [20, 21]. It may be possible to alleviate the crowdsourcing dilemma by
similar repeated encounters between players in crowdsourcing competitions such
that a socially desirable state such as a decreased level of attacks emerges.
In fact, mutual cooperation emerges in the iterated prisoner’s dilemma under
appropriate conditions if players adopt conditional strategies such as variants
of Tit-for-Tat (i.e., do what the opponent did in the last round) [20–25]. In the
present study, we examine a full range of conditional strategies by formulating a
variant of the crowdsourcing dilemma game as an iterated game. For a compu-
tational reason, we restrict ourselves to the strategies that use the information
about the action of the opponent in the previous encounter.
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Results
Model
To examine evolutionarily stable strategies (ESSs), we consider an infinitely
large well-mixed population of players in which two randomly selected players
are engaged in an iterated crowdsourcing dilemma game. Each player is engaged
in the game sufficiently many times in one generation.
Consider the iterated game between players 1 and 2. In every round of the
game, each player submits an action, which generally depends on the action of
the opponent in the previous round. We denote the action selected by player
i ∈ {1, 2} in round t by αi,t, which is either CA, CN, SA, or SN (Figure 1(a)).
With αi,t = CA (αi,t = SA), player i selects to crowdsource (not to crowdsource)
and attack the opponent if the opponent crowdsources in round t. With αi,t =
CN (αi,t = SN), player i selects to crowdsource (not to crowdsource) and not to
attack the opponent if the opponent crowdsources in round t. It should be noted
that CA and CN are behaviorally the same unless the opponent crowdsources.
In this case, the opponent that has not crowdsourced does not know whether
the focal player has selected CA or CN. By the same token, SA and SN are the
same unless the opponent crowdsources.
There are six types of action that a player i realizes in a single round (Fig-
ure 1(b)). We denote the realized action of player i in round t by θi,t, which is
either CA, CN, C∗, SA, SN, or S∗. θi,t = CA (θi,t = SA) means that player i
has crowdsourced (has not crowdsourced) and attacked the opponent. θi,t = CN
(θi,t = SN) means that player i has crowdsourced (has not crowdsourced) and
has not attacked the opponent. θi,t = C∗ (θi,t = S∗) means that player i has
crowdsourced (has not crowdsourced) and that whether player i has intended
to attack the opponent or not is unknown to the opponent. If θi,t is either CA,
CN, SA, or SN, i’s opponent has crowdsourced in round t. If θi,t is either C∗ or
S∗, i’s opponent has not crowdsourced. The relationship between the actions
selected by the two players and the realized actions perceived by the two players
is shown in Table 1.
We consider players adopting the so-called reactive strategies [22,23,25,26].
A player adopting a reactive strategy selects an action based on the opponent’s
realized action in the previous round. Therefore, a reactive strategy of player 1
is a mapping from θ2,t to α1,t+1. There are 4
6 = 4096 reactive strategies.
We assume that players commit an action implementation error with a small
probability ǫ (0 < ǫ ≪ 1). For simplicity, the decision of crowdsourcing and
that of attacking are assumed to err independently with the same probability
ǫ. For example, player intending CA actually carries out CA with probability
(1− ǫ)2, CN with probability ǫ(1− ǫ), SA with probability ǫ(1− ǫ), and SN with
probability ǫ2.
The payoff in a round is determined in the same way as in the original
crowdsourcing dilemma game [16]. A player’s productivity value is equal to zero
as normalization when the player does not crowdsource. It obeys the uniform
distribution on (0, 1) when the player crowdsources. A player needs to pay
cost q ∈ (0, 1) to attack the opponent to reduce the opponent’s productivity
by d ∈ (0, 1). The player that finally obtains the higher productivity than the
opponent wins the unitary payoff in the current round. The other player gains
nothing. If the productivity values of the two players are the same, each player
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wins with probability 1/2. It should be noted that players decide the actions
without referring to the productivity values of the player itself and the opponent.
We do not consider time discounting of the payoff across rounds and do
assume that the number of rounds is very large. Therefore, we are concerned
with the stationary state of the actions adopted by the two players and the
payoff per round.
Even if we confine ourselves to a single-round game, the present model is
slightly different from the previous model [16] in the following aspects. First,
in the previous model [16], it was assumed that the productivity values of both
players thanks to crowdsourcing were unknown to each player when the players
determined whether to crowdsource or not in the first stage. The productiv-
ity values were then revealed just before the second stage occurred. In other
words, if the opponent has crowdsourced, the focal player knows the opponent’s
productivity (and the focal player’s own productivity if the focal player has
crowdsourced) before they determine whether to attack the opponent or not.
Therefore, each player is assumed to obey the best response rule in the second
stage. In contrast, in the present model, we assumed that the players select
the actions for the first stage (i.e., crowdsource or not to crowdsource) and the
second stage (i.e., attack or not to attack) in the beginning of the round without
knowing the productivity of the players in the middle of the round. We changed
the model in this way because, otherwise, there are a continuum of pure strate-
gies because of the productivity is continuously valued. By confining ourselves
to a model with a finite set of discrete pure strategies, we aim to carry out an
exhaustive and rigorous analysis of the model to understand the iterated as well
as non-iterated crowdsourcing dilemma game.
Non-iterated game
We started by analyzing the non-iterated crowdsourcing dilemma game. Be-
cause strategies conditioned on the realized action in the previous round are
irrelevant, there are four pure strategies, i.e., CA, CN, SA, and SN. The ESSs
in the full (d, q) parameter space are shown in Figure 2. The figure indicates
that crowdsourcing is stable when the damage inflicted by an attack (i.e., d) is
small or the cost of attack (i.e., q) is large. Attacking is stable when d is large
or q is small.
The results shown in Figure 2 are qualitatively the same as those for the
previously analyzed single-shot crowdsourcing dilemma game [16] in the mean-
ing that crowdsourcing is stable when d is small or q is large. In contrast, a
large q value does not prevent the players from attacking the opponent in the
previous model [16], whereas not to attack is an ESS for large q (irrespectively
of d) in the present model.
Evolutionary stability and efficiency for the iterated game
We exhaustively searched ESSs among the 4096 reactive strategies. We found
16 strategies that were ESSs in some regions of the (d, q) parameter space. The
16 ESSs are listed in Table 3. In the table, αn(SN), for example, indicates the
action selected when the opponent realized SN in the previous round. Each
strategy is an ESS in the parameter region specified by the label (one of (A)
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through (J)) shown in the table. The parameter regions are depicted in Figure 3
(see the caption for the precise definition).
Ten out of the 16 ESSs are efficient for some d and q values. The parameter
regions in which these ESSs are efficient are shown in Table 3. We checked the
condition for the efficiency by referring to the average payoffs of ESSs in the
homogeneous population (Table 4).
Strategies 1, 2, and 3 are unconditional strategies, whereas the other strate-
gies are conditional strategies. We call the three unconditional strategies uncond-
CA, uncond-CN, and uncond-SA, respectively.
In parameter regions (B) and (C), uncond-CN and uncond-SA are efficient
ESSs, respectively. This result is the same as that for the single-shot game
(Figure 2). In the intersection of regions (B) and (C), which is region (D),
strategies 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 are also efficient ESSs. In subregions of (B)
and (C), strategies 10, 11, 13, 15, and 16 are inefficient ESSs. Strategies 10,
11, and 15, but not 13 yield the same payoff as the efficient ESSs in the limit
ǫ→ 0. Strategy 13 is the only ESS that yields a smaller payoff than that of the
coexisting unconditional ESS (i.e., uncond-SA) in the limit ǫ→ 0.
In region (A), neither uncond-CN nor uncond-SA is an ESS, and uncond-CA
is an inefficient ESS. Instead, strategy 12 or 14, both of which are conditional
strategies, is the efficient ESS in the region. It should be noted that, in the
single-shot game, (uncond-)CA is the unique ESS in this parameter region (Fig-
ure 2). Because regions (A), (B), and (C) exhaust the entire parameter space
0 < d < 1, 0 < q < 1, conditional ESSs yield larger payoffs than unconditional
ESSs only in region (A). In other words, making the crowdsourcing dilemma
game an iterated game improves the efficiency of the ESS exclusively in this
parameter region.
Region (A) is composed of subregions (K) and (L).
In region (K), strategy 14 is not an ESS, and strategy 12 is the efficient ESS.
The payoff of strategy 12 in the homogeneous population is larger than that of
uncond-CA by (1/2)qǫ+O(ǫ2). The difference vanishes in the limit ǫ→ 0. This
is because a pair of players adopting strategy 12 almost always implements CA
for infinitesimally small ǫ.
In spite of this similarity between strategy 12 and uncond-CA, strategy 12
is efficient because, when a pair of players adopts strategy 12, their realized
actions persist in SA for some time once both players start implementing SA.
To understand this phenomenon, consider the situation in which both players
adopting strategy 12 implement CA. This situation almost always occurs in
the limit ǫ → 0. The two players simultaneously switch to SA if both players
commit an error to select either SA or SN in the same round. This event occurs
with probability
[
ǫ (1− ǫ) + ǫ2
]2
= ǫ2. They return to selecting CA if either
player commits an error to select CA or CN. This event occurs with probability
1 −
[
1− ǫ (1− ǫ)− ǫ2
]2
= 2ǫ − ǫ2. Therefore, the fraction of the number of
rounds in which the two players implement SA is approximately equal to (1/2)ǫ
for small ǫ. During the period in which the two players implement SA, the cost
of attack is evaded. In contrast, a player adopting uncond-CA cannot avoid
the cost of attack, irrespective of whether the opponent adopts uncond-CA or
strategy 12. This is because the repetition of SA does not persist and both
players almost always implement CA. Therefore, strategy 12 is stable against
invasion by uncond-CA and yields a slightly larger payoff than uncond-CA in
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the homogeneous population.
In region (L), strategy 14 is the efficient ESS. The payoff of strategy 14 in the
homogeneous population is larger than that of uncond-CA by q + O(ǫ), which
does not vanish for infinitesimally small ǫ.
A pair of players adopting uncond-CA almost always implements CA and
obtains 1/2− q per round for infinitesimally small ǫ. This is because both play-
ers pay the cost of attack (i.e., q) and win the game with probability 1/2. In
contrast, a pair of players adopting strategy 14 almost always implements SA
for infinitesimally small ǫ, as shown in Table 4. The two players obtain 1/2 per
round; each player wins with probability 1/2 without paying the cost of attack.
This is the reason why strategy 14 yield a larger payoff than uncond-CA in the
limit ǫ → 0. A player adopting strategy 14 alternates between CA and SA in
the absence of error if the opponent adopts uncond-CA. In this situation, the
average payoff of the opponent is equal to (1/2) {(1− d) + (1/2− q)}. There-
fore, strategy 14 is stable against invasion by uncond-CA when q > 1/2 − d.
This condition defines a boundary of region (L). It should be noted that, when
d < 1/2, i.e., when being attacked is not so costly, players gain a larger pay-
off by selecting CA rather than SA irrespective of the action of the opponent.
Therefore, in contrast to strategy 14, uncond-SA is not stable in region (L).
Size of attractive basins of different ESSs in parameter re-
gion (A)
In the previous section, we revealed that conditional strategies were the only ef-
ficient ESSs in region (A). For these conditional strategies to establish a foothold
in an evolutionary context, they should also have a sufficiently large attractive
basin under evolutionary dynamics. Therefore, we compare the relative size of
the attractive basins of the ESSs in region (A). We examine replicator dynamics
composed only of ESSs because it is not feasible to treat the dynamics composed
of all 4096 strategies. Region (K) allows two ESSs, i.e., uncond-CA and strat-
egy 12. Region (L) is divided into subregion (L1) that allows three ESSs, i.e.,
uncond-CA, strategy 12, and strategy 14, and subregion (L2) that allows two
ESSs, i.e., uncond-CA and strategy 14. The boundary between (L1) and (L2) is
given by q = 1 − 2d. These regions within region (A) are depicted in Figure 4.
We separately calculated the size of attractive basins for regions (K), (L1), and
(L2).
The size of the attractive basin for each ESS is shown in Figure 4 with
ǫ = 10−3. The attractive basins of strategies 12 and 14 are larger than that of
uncond-CA for a large parameter region in region (A). In particular, strategies
12 and 14 have the largest attractive basin in most of region (K) and the entire
region (L2), respectively. Therefore, conditional strategies 12 and 14 are not
only efficient but also reached from various initial conditions under replicator
dynamics.
Discussion
We explored the possibility of improving the quality of solution in a crowd-
sourcing game by analyzing an iterated game. We found that the crowdsourcing
dilemma was alleviated when the damage inflicted by an attack (i.e., d) and the
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cost of attack (i.e., q) were small (i.e., region (A)). In this parameter region, an
unconditional strategy (uncond-CA) and either conditional strategy (strategy
12 or 14) are coexisting ESSs. Furthermore, repetition of the game allows the
emergence of the equilibria (i.e., strategies 12 and 14) that are more efficient
than the equilibrium for the single-shot game (i.e., uncond-CA). In the other
parameter regions, repeated encounters do not alter the efficient ESSs relative
to the case of the non-iterated game.
Strategy uncond-CA is analogous to unconditional defection in the prisoner’s
dilemma game. Strategies 12 and 14 are analogous to retaliative strategies in
the prisoner’s dilemma game. However, we emphasize that, the loose analogue
between the crowdsourcing dilemma game and the prisoner’s dilemma game is
only justified in region (A). Because strategy 12 is only marginally superior
to uncond-CA in region (A), we discuss the combat between strategy 14 and
uncond-CA; the homogeneous population of strategy 14 yields the payoff that
is larger by ≈ q than that realized by the homogeneous population of uncond-
CA. If strategy 14 and uncond-CA play the iterated game, each strategist almost
always selects CA or SA. CA and SA are analogous to defection and cooperation
in the prisoner’s dilemma, respectively. If both selects SA, both players obtain
1/2 in a single round if O(ǫ) terms are neglected. If the focal player selects SA
and the opponent selects CA, the focal player gains d − q. If the focal player
selects CA and the opponent selects SA, the focal player gains 1 − d. If both
players select CA, both players obtain 1/2−q. Because 1−d > 1/2 > 1/2−q >
d− q and 2× (1/2) > (1− d) + (d− q), the single-shot crowdsourcing dilemma
game played by strategy 14 and uncond-CA is identified with the prisoner’s
dilemma.
The uncond-CA strategy is equivalent to the unconditional defector in the
prisoner’s dilemma. To describe the behavior of the player adopting strategy 14,
we refer to such a player simply as strategy 14 here. If strategy 14 realizes SA
and the opponent realizes SA, corresponding to mutual cooperation, strategy 14
selects SA (i.e., cooperation) in the next round. If strategy 14 realizes SA and
the opponent realizes CA, strategy 14 is exploited by the opponent and switches
to CA (i.e., defection) in the next round. If strategy 14 realizes CA and the
opponent realizes SA, strategy 14 exploits the opponent and continues to select
CA. If strategy 14 realizes CA and the opponent realizes CA, corresponding to
mutual defection, strategy 14 switches to SA. Therefore, strategy 14 is equivalent
to the win-stay lose-shift strategy in the iterated prisoner’s dilemma [23,24]. Our
results pertaining to the improved efficiency of strategy 14 relative to uncond-
CA are consistent with the results obtained for the win-stay lose-shift strategy
in the iterated prisoner’s dilemma [23, 24].
Intuitively, crowdsourcing and not attacking are both analogous to coopera-
tion, and not crowdsourcing and attacking are analogous to defection. However,
the present model as well as the previous one [16] do not allow the associa-
tion between crowdsourcing (not crowdsourcing) and cooperation (defection)
because of the definition of the payoff. In both models, the winning player
gains a payoff equal to unity. Given that attacking does not occur, crowdsourc-
ing increases the probability of winning owing to the enhanced productivity.
However, whether the solution is made in-house or by crowdsourcing does not
affect the payoff in any other way. For example, if the realized actions of both
players are SN (i.e., not crowdsourcing and not attacking), each player gains
an expected payoff equal to 1/2. If the realized actions of the two players are
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CN (i.e., crowdsourcing and not attacking), the payoff remains the same. How-
ever, in real situations, crowdsourcing is considered to improve the quality of
the solution unless an attack occurs [3,5,11]. To examine non-iterated and iter-
ated crowdsourcing dilemma games with this added component warrants future
work. In this study, we confined ourselves to a simpler scenario, thus avoiding
to introduce yet a new parameter.
Methods
Calculation of average payoffs
Throughout the present paper, we concentrate on the set of pure reactive strate-
gies. We calculate the average payoff of player 1 that adopts reactive strategy
n when the opponent player 2 adopts reactive strategy m, denoted by πnm.
In each round, there are nine possible pairs of actions realized by the two
players. In other words, (θ1,t, θ2,t) is either (CA,CA), (CA,CN), (CN,CA),
(CN,CN), (C∗,SA), (C∗,SN), (SA,C∗), (SN,C∗), or (S∗,S∗). Given (θ1,t, θ2,t),
the actions that the two players intend to carry out in the next round are de-
termined by n and m. Then, we calculate the probability with which each
pair of actions (α1,t+1, α2,t+1) is actually selected. This probability depends
on ǫ. Then, the two players play the game such that a pair of realized ac-
tions (θ1,t+1, θ2,t+1) is uniquely determined from the pair of selected actions
(α1,t+1, α2,t+1), as shown in Table 1. By combining the stochastic mapping from
(θ1,t, θ2,t) to (α1,t+1, α2,t+1) and the deterministic mapping from (α1,t+1, α2,t+1)
to (θ1,t+1, θ2,t+1), we obtain the transition probability from (θ1,t, θ2,t) to (θ1,t+1, θ2,t+1).
Any (θ1,t+1, θ2,t+1) is reached from any (θ1,t, θ2,t) with a positive probability be-
cause of the error (ǫ > 0). Therefore, the Markov chain on (θ1,t, θ2,t) is ergodic
and possesses a unique stationary distribution.
The average payoff of player 1 is given by
πnm =
∑
(θ1,t,θ2,t)
P ∗(θ1,t, θ2,t)π1(θ1,t, θ2,t), (1)
where P ∗(θ1,t, θ2,t) is the probability that (θ1,t, θ2,t) is realized in the station-
ary state, and π1(θ1,t, θ2,t) is the expected payoff of player 1 under (θ1,t, θ2,t).
Table 2 shows the values of π1(θ1,t, θ2,t). It should be noted that if both players
crowdsource, player 1 attacks player 2, and player 2 does not attack player 1
(i.e., (θ1,t, θ2,t) = (CA,CN)), then player 1 wins if p1 > p2− d, where p1 and p2
are productivity values of players 1 and 2, respectively. This event occurs with
probability 1− (1/2)(1− d)2.
Evolutionary stability and efficiency
Strategy n is an ESS if πnn > πmn is satisfied or both πnn = πmn and πnm >
πmm are satisfied for all m 6= n. We enumerate all ESSs as follows using
essentially the same exhaustive search method as that used for studying indirect
reciprocity [27].
Consider strategy n. For all strategies m 6= n, we check the following con-
ditions. If πnn and πmn are not the same function in terms of d, q, and ǫ, we
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expand the difference with respect to ǫ as follows:
πnn − πmn =
∞∑
k=0
ak(d, q)ǫ
k. (2)
We denote the nonzero coefficient of the lowest order on the right-hand side
of Eq. (2) by ak(d, q). For infinitesimally small ǫ, strategy n is stable against
invasion by strategy m if ak(d, q) > 0. If πnn and πmn are the same function,
then we compare πnm and πmm via the same procedure. If πnm and πmm are
the same function, strategy n is not an ESS because it is neutrally stable against
invasion by strategy m. If n is not invaded by any m, even neutrally, n is an
ESS.
We say that ESS n is efficient if πnn ≥ πmm for all other ESSs m(6= n). To
check the efficiency of ESSs, we expand πnn − πmm with respect to ǫ and look
at the sign of the non-zero coefficient of the lowest order.
Calculation of the size of the attractive basin under repli-
cator dynamics
We denote the frequency of players adopting strategy n by xn ∈ [0, 1]. The
replicator equation is given by
dxn
dt
= xn(πn − π¯), (3)
where πn =
∑
m πnmxm and π¯ =
∑
n πnxn.
Consider the case in which just two pure-strategy ESSs, denoted by n = 1
and 2, exist. Then, under the replicator dynamics composed of two strategies 1
and 2, the relative size of the attractive basin of strategy 1 is given by (π11 −
π21)/(π11 + π22 − π12 − π21).
Consider the case in which three pure-strategy ESSs, denoted by n = 1,
2, and 3, exist. Then, we assume a population composed of the three ESSs
and determine the basin size of the ESSs by direct numerical integration of the
replicator equation because analytical expressions are difficult to obtain. We
run the dynamics from initial conditions (x1, x2, x3) = (ℓ1∆, ℓ2∆, ℓ3∆), where
∆ = 1/200, and (ℓ1, ℓ2, ℓ3) is a set of integers that satisfy 0 < ℓ1, ℓ2, ℓ3 < 200
and ℓ1 + ℓ2 + ℓ3 = 200. We count the number of initial conditions such that
all players finally adopt strategy 1 and divide it by the total number of initial
conditions. The calculated fraction defines the relative size of the attractive
basin of strategy 1. Parallel definitions are applied to strategies 2 and 3.
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Figure 1: Actions selected and realized in a single round. (a) Four types of
actions selected by a player in a single round. (b) Six types of actions realized
by a player in a single round.
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Figure 2: Phase diagram for the single-shot game. In the region labeled CN/SA,
both CN and SA are ESSs.
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Figure 3: Parameter regions (A) to (L) in the (d, q) space. In addition to the
trivial condition 0 < d, q < 1, the 12 regions are defined as follows. Region
(A): d < 1/2 and q < (1/2)d(2 − d). Region (B): q > (1/2)d(2 − d). Region
(C): d > 1/2 and q < d. Region (D): d > 1/2 and (1/2)d(2 − d) < q < d.
Region (E): d > 1/2 and max{(1/2)d(2 − d), (3/2)(2d − 1)} < q < d. Region
(F): q < min{(1/2)d(2 − d), 1 − 2d}. Region (G): d > 1/2 and 2d − 1 < q <
(1/2)d(2− d). Region (H): max{1/2− d, d− 1/2} < q < (1/2)d(2− d). Region
(I): max{d, 1/2} < q < 3/4. Region (J): max{(2/5)(1 + 2d − d2), d} < q <
min{(1/2)(−1 + 6d− 3d2), 6/7}. Region (K): q < min{(1/2)d(2− d), 1/2− d}.
Region (L): d < 1/2 and 1/2− d < q < (1/2)d(2− d).
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Figure 4: Details of region (A). (a) Three subregions of region (A) in the (d, q)
space. (b), (c), (d) Relative sizes of the attractive basins. (b) uncond-CA, (c)
strategy 12, and (d) strategy 14. We set ǫ = 10−3. The two solid lines in
(b), (c), and (d) represent the boundaries between the subregions. The size of
attractive basin of strategies 12 and 14 is equal to zero in region (L2) and region
(K), respectively, because they are not ESSs in the corresponding region.
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Table 1: Relationship between the actions selected by the two players and the
realized actions.
α1,t α2,t θ1,t θ2,t
CA CA CA CA
CA CN CA CN
CA SA C∗ SA
CA SN C∗ SN
CN CA CN CA
CN CN CN CN
CN SA C∗ SA
CN SN C∗ SN
SA CA SA C∗
SA CN SA C∗
SA SA S∗ S∗
SA SN S∗ S∗
SN CA SN C∗
SN CN SN C∗
SN SA S∗ S∗
SN SN S∗ S∗
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Table 2: The expected payoff π1(θ1,t, θ2,t) of player 1 when the realized actions
of player 1 and 2 are θ1,t and θ2,t, respectively.
θ1,t θ2,t π1(θ1,t, θ2,t)
CA CA 1/2− q
CA CN 1− (1/2)(1− d)2 − q
CN CA (1/2)(1− d)2
CN CN 1/2
C∗ SA 1− d
C∗ SN 1
SA C∗ d− q
SN C∗ 0
S∗ S∗ 1/2
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Table 3: ESSs. αn(θ) is the action that a player with strategy n selects when
the opponent’s realized action was θ in the previous round. The regions for ESS
and efficiency in the table indicate the parameter regions in which the strategy
is an ESS and an efficient ESS, respectively. See Figure 3 for the definition of
the region labels. If an ESS is efficient nowhere, the entry for the region for
efficiency remains blank.
Strategy (n) αn(CA) αn(CN) αn(C∗) αn(SA) αn(SN) αn(S∗)
Region
for ESS
Region for
efficiency
1 (uncond-CA) CA CA CA CA CA CA (A)
2 (uncond-CN) CN CN CN CN CN CN (B) (B)
3 (uncond-SA) SA SA SA SA SA SA (C) (C)
4 CN CN CN CN CN SA (D) (D)
5 CN CN SA SA SA CN (D) (D)
6 CN CN SA SA SA SA (D) (D)
7 SA SA CN CN CN CN (D) (D)
8 SA SA CN CN CN SA (D) (D)
9 SA SA SA SA SA CN (D) (D)
10 CN SA SA SA SA SA (D)
11 CN SA CN CN CN SA (E)
12 CA CA CA CA CA SA (F) (K)
13 SA SA CA CA CA CA (G)
14 SA SA CA CA CA SA (H) (L)
15 SN CA CA CA CA SN (I)
16 SN CN CA CA CA SN (J)
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Table 4: Stationary distribution of the selected actions of two players adopting
an ESS, in the limit ǫ → 0. P (α) is the probability that both players select
action α. The probability that the two players select different actions tends to
zero as ǫ → 0. The payoff when both players adopt the same strategy is also
shown.
Strategy (n) P (CA) P (CN) P (SA) P (SN) Payoff (πnn)
1 (uncond-CA) 1 0 0 0 (1/2− q) + 2qǫ− qǫ2
2 (uncond-CN) 0 1 0 0 1/2− qǫ + qǫ2
3 (uncond-SA) 0 0 1 0 1/2− qǫ + qǫ2
4 0 1 0 0 1/2− qǫ + qǫ2
5 0 1 0 0 1/2− qǫ + qǫ2
6 0 0 1 0 1/2− qǫ + qǫ2
7 0 1/2 1/2 0 1/2− qǫ + qǫ2
8 0 0 1 0 1/2− qǫ + qǫ2
9 0 1/2 1/2 0 1/2− qǫ + qǫ2
10 0 0 1 0 1/2− qǫ + qǫ2 − 2qǫ3 +O(ǫ4)
11 0 0 1 0 1/2− qǫ − qǫ2 + 8qǫ3 +O(ǫ4)
12 1 0 0 0 (1/2− q) + (5/2)qǫ− (5/2)qǫ2 + qǫ3 +O(ǫ4)
13 1/2 0 1/2 0 (1/2)(1− q) + (3/2)qǫ2 − qǫ3 +O(ǫ4)
14 0 0 1 0 1/2− 3qǫ+ 9qǫ2 − 10qǫ3 +O(ǫ4)
15 0 0 0 1 1/2− 2qǫ+ 20qǫ3 +O(ǫ4)
16 0 0 0 1 1/2− 2qǫ+ (1/4)qǫ2 + (399/16)qǫ3 +O(ǫ4)
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